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The idea of a liberal democratic peace 
 
An impressive literature has developed in recent years dealing with the topic of a 
liberal democratic peace. A debate has been conducted in North American and British 
political science journals such as International Security, American Political 
ScienceReview, Comparative Political Studies and Review of International Studies  
about the validity of the hypothesis that the growth in the number of states with 
liberal-democratic polities will lead to a more stable and harmonious international 
order. In the literature on democratic peace Kant has been much referred to: it is true 
to say that he has become an emblem of the thesis. This is so to such an extent that 
authors need only cite Kant in their title to show that they are engaging with the 
debate. Others make play with Kant’s name to demonstrate their topicality such as 
Christopher Layne’s title to his article ‘Kant or cant: The Myth of the Democratic 
Peace’ in International Security.119 (1994). Accordingly we shall follow through the 
liberal-democratic peace thesis here in terms of the three main principles laid down in 
Kant’s seminal essay Perpetual Peace.  These are the requirements of his three 
definitive articles: 
1. that the constitution of states should be republican 
2. that the basis of international law should be a federation of free states 
3. that each individual is entitled to be treated with hospitality when meeting the 
inhabitants of other states. 
In these three articles we have a measure of the contemporary peace theory and also  
its main source. In the final section we shall look at the thesis through the perspective 





The debate on the democratic peace has its origins in a resurgence of interest in 
Kant’s political philosophy and international relations which occurred in the early 
1980s. One of the writers who most effectively caught on to this trend was Michael 
Doyle, who in two articles in Philosophy and Public Affairs in 1983 highlighted 
Kant’s legacy to liberalism and internationalism which were then distilled into the one 
key article in the American Political Science Review 80 (1986) ‘Liberalism and World 
Politics’. Although in the APSR article Kant is cited along with Machiavelli and 
Schumpeter it is clear that Kant forms the centrepiece of Doyle’s argument. For Doyle 
Kant’s views on politics not only have a valuable policy component in that they show 
how American foreign relations ought best to be framed but also have a significant 
empirical relevance in that Kant is ‘a liberal republican whose theory of 
internationalism best accounts for what we are’. Doyle’s object then is to put forward 
Kant’s political theory as a model of good practice for liberal democratic states to 
follow. 
 
Doyle’s thesis has a moral and empirical side to it. The moral side is naturally that 
policy-makers should be informed by Kant’s liberal internationalism and the 
empirical side is to show that where policy-makers have been informed by Kant’s 
principles that in terms of peace it has turned out to be quite successful. In the liberal 
democratic thesis the behaviour of states that conform as near as possible to Kant’s 
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model of a republic comes under close scrutiny. The APSR article has a three page 
appendix where all the liberal regimes which have existed from 1700-1982 are listed 
and all the international wars since 1817 onwards are given chronologically. Doyle 
rests some of his conclusions upon this evidence. As he states in the abstract of his 
article, ‘liberal states are different. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as 
Kant argued they would.’3 The evidence therefore is mixed but in no sense refutes the 
position Doyle believes Kant and other liberals to hold. Living by the rules outlined 
by Kant in his Definitive Articles to Perpetual Peace can pay in terms of the 
avoidance of war. Indeed Doyle seems to believe that even closer attention to Kant’s 
arguments might have paid off because he fears that in some respects the rulers of 
liberal democratic states may have been prone to be ‘trigger happy’ contrary to Kant’s 
pacific recommendations. Where contrary to their liberal beliefs liberal democratic 
states have got involved in wars to defend liberal causes this has often turned out 
badly. In so far as western democratic states have found liberal grounds for aggression 





Further credence has been given to the democratic peace thesis by Francis 
Fukuyama’s writing on the End of History. Fukuyama gets to democratic peace via a 
very different route from Doyle. Fukuyama is particularly struck by the notion of a 
struggle for recognition that occurs in human history. He borrows this notion of a 
struggle for recognition from Hegel’s philosophy. Fukuyama uses the notion of the 
struggle for recognition - a struggle which affects all human individuals - as a means 
of dismissing all but the democratic republic as a legitimate form of government. The 
difficulty with all non-democratic forms of government is that they prevent the 
struggle for recognition which always occurs between free human individuals from 
working itself out in a non-destructive form. Earlier, more authoritarian, forms of 
government stand in the way of such an equal form of recognition. They are based 
upon forms of recognition which elevate one individual or a group of individuals 
above the rest. Like Doyle Fukuyama provides his own list of democratic states in his 
writings.
4
 Fukuyama sees the spread of democracies as part of the universal history of 
mankind which is leading to the worldwide recognition of all individuals as equals. 
Fukuyama is highly optimistic about this course of events. In liberal democratic states 
no adults are excluded from the political process. This widening of participation in the 
political process takes the edge off the natural competition for preference amongst 
individuals. States that allow such full democratic civil competition fall outside 
history and those who fail to allow it are regarded as still within history. Fukuyama 
believes that Kant foresaw such a condition of universal peace in his political 
philosophy. Kant provided the basis for the development of a convincing liberal 
internationalism. Although it is Hegel who inspires Fukuyama’s vision of the 
universal homogenous state Fukuyama gains his vision of a democratic world peace 
from Kant. Fukuyama is aware that many of the liberal internationalist movements 
inspired by Kant, such as the League of Nations, have ended in failure. But Fukuyama 
argues that ‘what many people have not understood, however,  is that the actual 
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incarnation of the Kantian idea have been seriously flawed from the start by not 
following Kant’s own precepts.’5 
 
Broadly speaking Fukuyama believes the movement towards peace and democracy 
represents an irreversible process. The leaders of states may make poor choices or fail 
properly to see the road ahead. Their desire for power and prestige may momentarily 
stand in the way of their seeking mutual recognition in the world. But Fukuyama 
believes that the growth of modern science and the technological improvement which 
follows from it mean that human desire and human reason point in the same direction. 
Economic efficiency flows from the adoption of liberal democratic practices and 
rules. No state can afford to go it alone in the modern world economy. To flourish 
states have to open their markets and encourage both trade and investment. In this 
respect Fukuyama envisages a kind of economic determinacy which forces people 
towards greater democracy and the opportunity of peace. This argument seems very 
similar to the ‘guarantee’ of eternal peace which nature provides which Kant puts 
forward in the first supplement to Perpetual Peace
6
. With Fukuyama the democratic 
peace theory ceases to be a hypothesis and becomes instead a reality. 
 
‘Liberalism and World Politics’ 
 
The empirical tone of the debate is most marked in both Fukuyama and Doyle. Their 
focus is upon the factual reality or otherwise of Kant’s outline for perpetual peace. At 
the general philosophical level it should be borne in mind that Kant is more often 
regarded as a transcendental idealist rather than a straightforward defender of 
empiricism. Kant was very impressed by the empiricist philosophies of Locke and 
Hume but ultimately wished to differ with them about the importance of observation 
in the construction of human knowledge. Kant wanted to emphasize in his critical 
philosophy the active human part played in the production of knowledge as well as 
the passive part played by the absorption of data. This brings us to the most striking 
overall difference between Doyle/Fukuyama’s approach to the growth of a peaceful 
world order and Kant’s. In many respects Doyle and Fukuyama play the role of 
passive spectators in observing the role of liberal republican regimes in bringing about 
peace whereas Kant’s main emphasis is on the role that the leaders of states and an 
enlightened public can play in realizing the goal. Kant’s Perpetual Peace represents 
the most explicit kind of moral advocacy where facts are brought in to demonstrate 
that Kant’s goals are not wholly unrealistic whereas Doyle and Fukuyama’s work is 
directed more to showing the empirical feasibility of the goal of a democratic peace 
and its possible moral desirability. For Doyle and Fukuyama the lure of the 
democratic peace thesis lies mainly in its apparent present empirical validity whereas 
for Kant the allure of his thesis stands independently of particular present facts. For 
Kant we ought to aim at a world made up of free, republican states because this is the 
right thing to do even if present circumstances do not indicate with total clarity that 
this will bring lasting peace. Kant thinks that we have to work on the assumption that 
the thesis can be shown both morally as well as empirically to be correct. 
 
Doyle’s argument is therefore not at odds with Kant’s arguments for peace. The 
criticism that might legitimately be levelled at Doyle and Fukuyama is that they tell 
only part of the story. As Doyle eloquently puts it, ‘beginning in the eighteenth 
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century and slowly growing since then, a zone of peace, which Kant called the 
‘pacific federation’ or ‘pacific union’, has begun to be established among liberal 
societies. More than 40 liberal states currently make up the union. It is interesting to 
note that Doyle draws his argument primarily from one section only of Kant’s essay 
on Perpetual Peace, this is the section in which Kant outlines the three definitive 
articles for a lasting peace. Doyle does have a strong justification in that the three 
definitive articles represent the main positive points that Kant wished to highlight 
with his essay. These stipulate the requirements for a republican form of government 
(1); for a federation of free states (2); and for cosmopolitan law to be limited to the 
right of universal hospitality. These three definitive laws provide the backbone for 
Doyle’s argument and the first two are also highlighted by Fukuyama.7 Neither 
discuss in great detail the ‘guarantee’ for perpetual peace which Kant discusses in the 
first supplement and would seem, dealing as it does with the course of history upon 
the development of peace, to have an important bearing upon their arguments. 
Overlooked also are Kant’s views on the role of the philosopher, his discussions of 
morality and politics and his reflections on the role of publicity in politics. 
 
Doyle’s account of Kant is therefore a highly selective one. But in those matters he 
chooses to discuss Doyle is accurate and persuasive. Indeed, in very many respects 
both Doyle and Fukuyama get Kant right. Doyle in particular provides a highly 
accurate report of the kind of internal social and political structure it is important to 
have in order to ensure the most rapid progress towards peace, and his discussion of 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism is illuminating and valuable. Although Doyle’s Kantian 
argument has been called the democratic peace theory Doyle himself sensibly stresses 
that Kant’s main emphasis is upon the republican nature of the ideal form of 
government. This is in line with Kant’s views. In fact we can add that in his original 
account of the kind of rule most suitable for bringing international harmony in 
Perpetual Peace Kant is quite hostile to the democratic form. Kant’s republican ideal 
is intended to prevent all kinds of despotism, not only the despotism of one individual 
who rules arbitrarily from the top but also the despotism of a group of the people who 
might seek to rule arbitrarily from the bottom. In a republic, as Kant understands it, 
there has to be a proper separation of powers between the executive, legislature, and 
judiciary. Not only are the rulers not allowed to make the law they are also not 
allowed to interfere in the adjudication of infringements to the law. The First 
Definitive Article 
This very strict separation of powers rules out direct democracy as an ideal of 
government for Kant. Just as it would not be right if one individual sought to control 
each branch of the government order so also it has to be wrong if the people as a body 
seeks to control the executive, legislature and judiciary. As Kant puts it, ‘any form of 
government which is not representative is essentially an anomally.’ 8 Doyle stresses 
this point.
9
 But there is a large gap in Doyle’s presentation of Kant’s thesis in relation 
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to democracy. Although Doyle makes no attempt to suggest that Kant is an enthusiast 
about democracy Doyle does not bring out the objections Kant has. We cannot, for 
instance, glean from Doyle’s discussion that Kant rules out democracy as a possible 
form of government. Kant thinks there are essentially only two forms of governement: 
the despotic or the republican.
10
 It might be argued here that Kant has in mind here 
with his critique a more radical kind of direct democracy than is now usual in Western 
states Yet still, I would argue, there are elements of Kant’s objections to democracy 
which have a bearing on the current practices of western democracies and on the 
application of Kant’s peace theory. Although Kant’s advocacy of the republican form 
of government can be read as very much favouring the kind of representative 
democracy to be found in countries such as the United States, Germany and France it 
can also he read as a warning against tendencies towards a majoritarian style of 
democracy which from time to time influence the government of these countries. Like 
Mill and Tocqueville Kant fears the tyranny of the majority and believes a genuinely 
rational form of government has to be properly structured to prevent it occurring. For 
example, it is difficult to see how Kant’s republicanism might wholly embrace the 
kind of party politics now prevalent in Western States. It is conceivable that Kant’s 
guidelines are compatible with parties competing for representation within 
legislatures and so with their success putting forward a certain legislative programme. 
However, it is difficult to see how Kant’s principles might be used to endorse parties 
competing for sole executive authority, particularly if that dominance were matched 
by an equal dominance in the legislature. Where a party uses executive authority to 
press through its own programme, and this programme is willed by a certain section 
of the population and not all, then the government must, according to Kant, tend 
towards despotism. It is true that most parties in Western states are not monolithic 
structures and have their own internal representative features which mitigates the 
problem. But where such parties tend towards unity or uniformity the danger of 
straying towards despotism (as Kant understands it) must exist. Thus, peculiarly, from 
Kant’s standpoint the more diverse, open, representative and pluralist a party the more 
it will conform to his ideal of government should it gain executive power. 
 
That Kant’s prescription for the ideal polity requires that majoritarian tendencies be 
kept in check has important implications for his peace thesis. Kant would regard states 
whose representative systems were liable to factional control as possibly more 
inclined to belligerence that other states where the republican model he outlines is 
more rigidly adhered to. Democratic states which allowed one party to control both its 
legislature and executive might be more prone to war than others; just as democratic 
states which allowed one set of opinions to predominate at the expense of others 
through inadequate public debate might be seen as less peaceable. Doyle and 
Fukuyamas optimistic approach to Kant’s thinking seems to overlook these 
possibilities which surely would have exercised Kant. It is very important for Kant 
that all citizens should regard the rulers as acting on their behalf, and with their 
authority, even if in many respects they disagree with the policies being pursued. 
Should political structures within a state systematically exclude one section of the 
population (which might be seen as occurring where some discriminatory political  
principles are taken to their extreme) then they cannot be fully regarded as co-citizens. 
The Second Definitive Article 
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What Doyle also perhaps glosses over in his writings and the liberal treatment of Kant 
in general has to deal with carefully is Kant’s attitude to the role of women as 
citizens. Essentially Kant excludes all women form active citizenship, as he does all 
dependants including wageworkers, servants and those without jobs. Kant thinks that 
such independent individuals who form a republic will be unlikely to seek war with 
other states, first, because they would through their representatives be making the 
decision on their own behalf and, secondly, if there were any costs to be borne they 
themselves would have to bear them. 
 
In this respect Doyle believe that ‘the apparent absence of war between liberal states, 
whether adjacent or not, for almost 200years thus may have significance.’ In states 
where the Kantian features of a separation of powers, representative government and 
some form of adult suffrage have been absent there seems not to have been the same 
restraint shown in relation with other states. What Doyle finds particularly striking is 
the behaviour of  liberal states (which best approximate to the Kantian model) when 
major wars actually occur. As Doyle puts it, ‘when states are forced to decide on 
which side of an impending world war they will fight, liberal states all wind up on the 
same side despite the complexity of the paths that take them there.’11 
 
Doyle is correct to emphasize how the behaviour of non-despotic states tends to point 
in the same direction. But it is doubtful that Kant would see this as proof of his 
contention. Because even if the leaders of a republican state were to take the ‘wrong’ 
side in a world war (which Finland is alleged to have done at the time of the Second 
World War in some of the literature calling the democratic theory into doubt
12
) this 
would not absolve the leaders of  all states from the duty of trying to hold to the 
project of perpetual peace in all their future actions. It is interesting that in Perpetual 
Peace Kant does not cite the behaviour of republican states to demonstrate the truth of 
his plan but rather he refers to such states from the standpoint of the example they 
might set to other states. He makes this clear in his comments upon the second 
definitive article where he states: ‘ If by good fortune one powerful and enlightened 
nation can form a republic (which by its nature is inclined to seek perpetual peace) 
this will provide a focal point for federal association among other states.’ 13 
 
A great deal of the discussion in the democratic peace debate has focussed on the 
extent to which states with Kantian style constitutions form a pacific union. 
Enthusiasts for the proposition have discovered that states with liberal constitutions 
tend to keep the peace in relation to each other and those who question the peace 
theory suggest that there is a great deal of evidence that states with such constitutions 
are still liable to war. Doyle’s thesis is that ‘liberal republics will progressively 
establish peace amongst themselves by means of the pacific federation (foedus 
pacificium) described in Kant’s Second Definitive Article’.14 In Doyle’s view, ‘most 
liberal theorists have offered inadequate guidance in understanding the exceptional 
nature of liberal pacification.’ Where many fall down, in Doyle’s view, is in their 
inability to explain the way in which some liberal states tend also to get embroiled in 
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war. In this respect Doyle thinks, ‘ Immanuel Kant offers the best guidance’.15 Kant is 
able to understand the tendency of liberal states to form with each other islands of 
peace and their tendency to be less at home with non-liberal states. 
 
Doyle understands Kant to be recommending in his Second Definitive Article neither 
a formal federation nor any institutionalized form of co-operation. Mainly Kant is 
emphasizing a disposition of states with republican constitutions not to attack each 
other militarily. But Doyle does go a bit further to suggest that Kant ‘appears to have 
in mind a mutual nonaggression pact, perhaps a collective security agreement.’16 This 
seems very close to what Kant suggests where he states in his Second Definitive 
Article that the ‘law of nations should be based on a federalism of free states’.17 
Particularly important in the way in which Kant formulates the Second Definitive 
Article is its markedly counterfactual nature. Kant is not speaking directly of any 
empirical state of affairs, present or future, in the article itself. He has in mind much 
more the intellectual presuppositions which form the basis for an effective 
international law. 
 
Indeed, I think that the main thrust of Kant’s Second Definitive Article for perpetual 
peace is a criticism of prevailing conceptions of international law which ground 
international law in the unrestricted sovereignty of states. The recommendation that a 
pacific federation of free states be formed is one that flows from this initial objection. 
Kant holds that very little progress can be attained in international politics if the 
leaders of states behave as rulers of entirely self-contained and wilfully independent 
territories who can declare war whenever they see fit upon any other such sovereign 
entities. The very conception of an international politics based upon such wholly 
unrestricted sovereignty carries the seeds of its own destruction. As Kant sees it, ’the 
concept of a law of nations becomes meaningless if interpreted as the right to go to 
war. Doyle is highly conscious of the federative aspect of Kant’s peace plan but does 
not bring out this indictment of the traditional notions of state sovereignty which 
underlie Kant’s critique of international law. Doyle notes that Kant’s ‘pacific union is 
not a single peace treaty ending one war, a world state, nor a state of nations. Kant 
finds the first insufficient. National sovereignty precludes reliable subservience to a 
state of nations; a world state destroys the civic freedom on which the development of 
human capacities rests.’18 It is indeed true those Kant rules out for the foreseeable 
future a world state resting upon a world-wide civil society but this is not because the 
pursuit of such a condition is morally wrong. In Kant’s view we ought to give up the 
total and arbitrary independence of our national state and seek to approximate to a 
world state. What prevents us from attaining the condition of world statehood which 
reason prescribes is the sheer physical difficulty of coordinating government over 
huge tracts of territory some of which are not developed (in Kant’s day this was of 
course a much greater problem than it is now) and the entrenched habits of the leaders 
of sovereign states. In Kant’s view the second poses the greatest difficulty. The 
attainment of state sovereignty is indeed a great step forward in the development of 
the human race, but it is not an absolutely valid arrangement. As Kant sees it, state 
sovereignty attains its proper validity when it merges over into a wider international 
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sovereignty of free states. The splendid majesty of the absolutely unrestricted 
sovereign state is an obstacle to world peace: 
 
We might thus expect that civilized peoples, each united with itself as a state, would 
hasten to abandon so degrading a condition as soon as possible. Fukuyama also does 
not realize the extent to which Kant’s Second Definitive Article implies a critique of 
the traditional notion of state sovereignty and international law. Kant wants to rewrite 
the rules of international society in a rational form, whereas Fukuyama is more 
concerned to point out how international society has already taken on a rational form. 
In keeping with Kant Fukuyama argues that ‘international law is merely domestic law 
writ large’ yet there is no direct recognition of the kind of mutation of state 
sovereignty this might involve. In the kind of world Kant envisages no one state can 
prevail over another, each has always to accommodate itself to the next as though 
they were neighbouring citizens within a civil society and state. But Fukuyama and 
Doyle both realize that in a peaceful condition of the Kantian variety state sovereignty 
cannot play the role it once did. Without clearly stating it both imply that the kind of 





The Third Definitive Article 
 
One of the great virtues of democratic peace theory is its moral egalitarianism. Each 
human individual for the proponent of a democratic peace counts for as much as every 
other. With Fukuyama this moral egalitarianism is evident in his emphasis upon what 
he calls isothymia. Fukuyama defines the term in relation to its opposite 
megalothymia. This is the ‘desire to be recognized as superior to other people’ 
whereas ‘its opposite is isothymia, the desire to be recognized as the the equal of other 
people.’20 Francis Fukuyama’s thesis is that the world must change, and is changing, 
to a situation where each person lives under a system of rule which fosters isothymia 
or equal recognition. He sees this happening, however, mainly within states. In 
drawing this picture of extending world-wide equality Fukuyama’s inspiration is 
Hegel who in his conception of the state properly develops the idea of mutual 
democratic recognition. 
 
By definition human individuals who are the only rational animals are equal. It is an 
offence against our dignity as human individuals to treat another human individual or 
group as inherently unequal to us. In this respect Doyle captures the spirit of Kant’s 
philosophy well. Doyle sees that Kant’s cosmopolitanism leads to a different style of 
international politics from that to which we are now accustomed. Kant’s doctrine of 
right would provide no grounds for the western imperial project of the modern world 
nor for any missionary intention to civilize forcefully non-western countries. Kant 
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 9 
rules out a patriarchal approach to government both internally and externally.
21
 The 
development of societies outside Europe must possess a voluntary dimension. Natives 
have to play a part themselves in drawing towards civilization. This comes out in 
Doyle’s interpretation of the Third Definitive Article to Perpetual Peace. 
‘Hospitality’, Doyle says, ‘does not require extending to foreigners either the right to 
citizenship or the right to settlement, unless the foreign visitors would perish if they 
were expelled. Foreign conquest and plunder also find no justification under this 
right.’ Imperialism of any kind is ruled out. ‘Hospitality does appear to include the 
right of access and the obligation of maintaining the opportunity for citizens to 
exchange goods and ideas without imposing the obligation to trade (a voluntary act in 
all cases under liberal constitutions’.22 
 
 
Doyle argues that liberal states, despite their internal liberal structures, have been 
prone to war with non-liberal societies. As he puts it: ‘the historical liberal legacy is 
laden with popular wars fought to promote freedom, to protect private property, or to 
support liberal allies against nonliberal enemies’.23 As Doyle suggests, Kant’s 
position would be at odds with this outcome. Partly these wars have occurred because 
the leaders of liberal states have demanded more than hospitality for their citizens and 
subjects in their relations with other states. In seeking to promote the freedom and 
advantage of visitors to foreign territories they often have asked not simply for safe 
passage but that a certain form of life be respected which is contrary to native 
traditions. Kant believes we ought not to venture beyond peaceful persuasion in trying 
to advance the condition of other nationals in their own states. Similarly liberal states 
are in no position to guarantee the property of their nationals abroad simply through 
the exertion of their own powers. The civil order of a foreign state is primarily its own 
responsibility. 
  
The Guarantee of perpetual peace 
 
In one of the most interesting supplements to Perpetual Peace Kant outlines what he 
describes as a guarantee provided by ‘the great artist nature herself’.24 Kant argues 
here that the apparently unguided course of historical development tends in the 
direction of human improvement often against our will. Kant cites a number of 
mechanisms that helps brings this about such as our competitiveness, our self-
interested pursuit of trade, the rivalry amongst nations and even war itself. Both 
Doyle and Fukuyama cite this mechanism of nature with approval. They approve of 
Kant’s guarantee because it highlights an empirical process which can help underpin 
the liberal democratic peace. For Doyle the guarantee works not because we are 
politically moral beings but through our less agreeable side. Whereas it might be 
argued that Kant is quite happy to see human short-sightedness and downright evil 
inadvertently playing a progressive role and this conflicting with the moral spirit 
within us, Doyle wants to unify the two forces. Those who are entirely focussed on 
their selfish interests are also playing a moral role. With Doyle the ‘hidden plan’ of 
nature complements our ethical duty.
25
 However with Kant the hidden plan steps in 
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only where we fail in our ethical duty. For Kant the hidden plan is not right in itself, 
rather it provides us with an incentive to do what is right.  
 
Kant argues that we cannot depend on the guarantee from a theoretical standpoint. We 
can rightly suppose that there are natural mechanisms at work which promote the aim 
of lasting peace. Despite the expressed aims of less scrupulous political leaders and 
their subjects we can discern over the longer term underlying trends which appear to 
be taking the human race forward. Perversely war itself might further these trends by 
bringing home to people the doleful effects of war. Societies who engage in this 
aggressive behaviour are forced to modernise quickly in order to employ the most 
advanced means for engaging in war. But this modernisation takes place with a 
concomitant growth in the potential and demand for freedom within the state. Self-
interest is, above all, what brings the progressive mechanism of nature into play. The 
hard-nosed pursuit of economic gain may have peaceful consequences. Although 
primarily motivated by the pursuit of profit those professionally engaged in trade and 
commerce come to dislike the disruption caused by wars. Over the long term Kant 
thinks that business prefers peace to war. 
 
Kant realizes that such projections about the progressive mechanism of history are not 
subject to clear empirical proof. Kant’s object is not to create sufficient certainty from 
a scientific standpoint but rather sufficient certainty from a moral standpoint. He 
thinks there is enough evidence to justify us from a moral standpoint pursuing 
progressive policies. Doyle and Fukuyama tend to overlook the voluntary side of 
human progress which forms the essential part of Kant’s guarantee. Both Doyle and 
Fukuyama are enthusiastic about the natural mechanism, especially Fukuyama who 
devotes several passages in his writings to the economic, social and political forces 
that drive us willy-nilly towards cooperation.
26
 Successful material acquisition under 
a free market system requires long-term peace and security. According to Fukuyama, 
a preoccupation with acquiring more consumer goods diverts people away from 
aggressive foreign policies and war. In keeping with Doyle and Fukuyama’s interest 
in the determinist side of Kant’s ‘hidden plan’ the literature on democratic peace 
concentrates heavily on the empirical verifiability of the perpetual peace thesis.
27
 This 
may not take us entirely off the Kantian track, since the more empirical evidence for 
the thesis which exists the fewer excuses there can be for refusing to seek progress in 
external policy, however, in the light of Kant’s priorities the emphasis is still a little 
one-sided. Kant’s main purpose is to bring morality and politics into accord, only then 




What does our examination of the liberal democratic peace thesis advanced by Doyle 
and Fukuyama from the standpoint of Kant’s original peace theory tell us? Our first 
conclusion might justifiably be that there is more to Kant’s original view than the 
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democratic peace theorists convey. There are elements in Kant’s argument, such as 
his powerful objections to forcible intervention in the affairs of other states, which are 
not fully considered. Just as Doyle and Fukuyama’s new interpretations of Kant’s 
thinking have uncovered many valuable ideas we might legitimately claim that there 
is even more to be discovered which might not only to the democratic peace thesis but 
also provide insights in other connected areas of politics. Classical political theory, 
such as Kant’s essay on Perpetual Peace, provides a permanent source of new insight 
into current national and international issues. 
 
Kant would have himself emphasized that we have to judge what constitutes 
knowledge and understanding ourselves. Kant’s political writings should of course be 
treated with respect, but not slavishly followed. Doyle and Fukuyama are each in their 
own way critically receptive. Two particular issues stand out as problematic in Kant’s 
account: 1. Kant’s exclusion of women from politically relevant roles; 2. His 
apparently optimistic view of the role finance and trade (operating through self-
interest) can play in the forging of international peace. 
 
In terms of the first, it would be fair to say that empirically the facts run against 
Kant’s exclusion of women. The seeds of wars seem often to lie in conflicts of 
economic interests. Although Doyle stresses once again the peaceful impetus brought 
about by overlapping economic interests
28
 the optimistic Kantian picture has to be 
weighed against the ambiguous, if not entirely contrary, empirical evidence. It is true 
to say that Kant was not depending on the world economic system automatically to 
bring about peace. Kant’s point is that in the long term contract – upon which trade 
and commerce rest – cannot function without trust and a sense of community. From 
an intelligible or logical standpoint war and trade are at odds. There is an irony here in 
that contemporary democratic peace theory has strongly emphasized the empirical 
dimension of  Kant’s thinking. Above all, the literature has concentrated on analyzing 
the behaviour of states with constitutions approximating to the one recommended to 
Kant. Their conclusion is that in relation to each other such states behave well, but 
they do not tell us it is because of the convergence of economic interests of these 
states or the peaceful intentions of their rulers. From a Kantian perspective the main 
gap in the contemporary literature is its tendency to underemphasize the moral side of 
Kant’s argument. Kant’s allusion to empirical developments is intended primarily to 
strengthen his moral argument rather than to provide conclusive proof. Those who 
require absolutely convincing proof of the viability of the peace project before signing 
up to it are precisely those Kant was not aiming to attract to his argument. His case for 
perpetual peace is made to those who already have moral intentions in politics. The 
liberal democratic peace will work only for those who aim to live in a morally 
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